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Falklands War

The Falklands War (Spanish: Guerra de las Malvinas or Guerra del Atlántico Sur), also known as the Falklands Conflict or Falklands Crisis, was a 1982 war between Argentina and the United Kingdom. The conflict resulted from the long-standing dispute over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, which lie in the South Atlantic, east of Argentina.

The Falklands War began on Friday 2 April 1982, when Argentine forces invaded and occupied the Falkland Islands and South Georgia. The British government dispatched a naval task force to engage the Argentine Navy and Air Force, and retake the islands by amphibious assault. The resulting conflict lasted 74 days and ended with the Argentine surrender on 14 June 1982, which returned the islands to British control. 649 Argentine military personnel, 255 British military personnel and three Falkland Islanders died during the conflict.

The conflict was the result of a protracted historical confrontation regarding the sovereignty of the islands. Argentina has asserted that the Falkland Islands are Argentinian territory since the 19th century and, as of 2012, shows no sign of relinquishing the claim.[4][5][6] The claim was added to the Argentine constitution after its reformation in 1994.[7] As such, the Argentine government characterised their initial invasion as the re-occupation of its own territory, whilst the British government saw it as an invasion of a British dependent territory. However, neither state officially declared war and hostilities were almost exclusively limited to the territories under dispute and the local area of the South Atlantic.

The conflict had a strong impact in both countries. Patriotic sentiment ran high in Argentina, but the outcome prompted large protests against the ruling military government, which hastened its downfall. In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's government was bolstered by the successful outcome, although its level of support fell in the 1983 general election. The war has played an important role in the culture of both countries, and has been the subject of several books, scholarly articles, films, and songs. Over time, the cultural and political weight of the conflict has had less effect on the British public than on that of Argentina, where the war is still a topic of discussion.[8]

Relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina were restored in 1989 under the umbrella formula which states that the islands' sovereignty dispute would remain aside.

Lead-up to the conflict

In the period leading up to the war, and especially following the transfer of power between military dictators General Jorge Rafael Videla and General Roberto Eduardo Viola in late-March 1981, Argentina had been in the midst of a devastating economic crisis and large-scale civil unrest against the military junta that had been governing the country since 1976.[12] In December 1981 there was a further change in the Argentine military regime bringing to office a new junta headed by General Leopoldo Galtieri (acting president), Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo and Admiral Jorge Anaya. Anaya was the main architect and supporter of a military solution for the long-standing claim over the islands,[13] calculating that the United Kingdom would never respond militarily.[14]

In doing so the Galtieri government hoped to mobilise Argentines' long-standing patriotic feelings towards the islands and thus divert public attention from the country's chronic economic problems and the regime's ongoing human rights violations.[15] Such action would also bolster its dwindling legitimacy. The newspaper La Prensa speculated in a step-by-step plan beginning with cutting off supplies to the Islands, ending in direct actions late in 1982, if the UN talks were fruitless.[16]

The ongoing tension between the two countries over the islands increased on 19 March when a group of Argentine scrap metal merchants (actually infiltrated by Argentine marines) raised the Argentine flag at South Georgia, an act that would later be seen as the first offensive action in the war. The Royal Navy ice patrol vessel HMS Endurance was dispatched from Stanley to South Georgia in response, subsequently leading to the invasion of South Georgia by Argentine forces on 3 April. The Argentine military junta, suspecting that the UK would reinforce its South Atlantic Forces,[17] ordered the invasion of the Falkland Islands to be brought forward to 2 April.

Britain was initially taken by surprise by the Argentine attack on the South Atlantic islands, despite repeated warnings by Royal Navy captain Nicholas Barker and others. Barker believed that the intention expressed in Defence Secretary John Nott's 1981 review planning future withdrawal of HMS Endurance, Britain's only naval presence in the South Atlantic, sent a signal to the Argentines that Britain was unwilling, and would soon be unable, to defend its territories and subjects in the Falklands.[18][19]

Argentine invasion

On 2 April 1982, Argentine forces mounted amphibious landings of the Falkland Islands, following the civilian occupation of South Georgia on 19 March, before the Falklands War began. The invasion met a nominal defence organised by the Falkland Islands' Governor Sir Rex Hunt, giving command to Major Mike Norman of the Royal Marines. Events included the landing of Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Sanchez-Sabarots' Amphibious Commandos Group, the attack on Moody Brook barracks, the engagement between the troops of Hugo Santillan and Bill Trollope at Stanley, and the final engagement and surrender at Government House.

Initial British response
Word of the invasion first reached Britain from Argentine sources.[20] A Ministry of Defence operative in London had a short, but vague telex conversation with Governor Hunt's telex operator, who confirmed that Argentines were on the island and in control.[20][21] Later that day, BBC journalist Laurie Margolis was able to speak with an islander at Goose Green via amateur radio, who confirmed the presence of a large Argentine fleet and that Argentine forces had taken control of the island.[20]

The British government had taken action prior to the 2 April invasion. In response to events on South Georgia the submarines HMS Splendid and HMS Spartan were ordered to sail South on 29 March, whilst the stores ship Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Fort Austin was dispatched from the Western Mediterranean to support HMS Endurance.[22] Lord Carrington had wished to send a third submarine but the decision was deferred due to concerns about the impact on operational commitments.[22] Co-incidentally on 26 March, the submarine HMS Superb left Gibraltar and it was assumed in the press it was heading south. There has since been speculation that the effect of those reports was to panic the Argentine junta into invading the Falklands before nuclear submarines could be deployed.[22]

The following day, during a crisis meeting headed by the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Sir Henry Leach, advised them that "Britain could and should send a task force if the islands are invaded". On 1 April Leach sent orders to a Royal Navy force carrying out exercises in the Mediterranean to be prepared to sail south. Following the invasion on 2 April, after an emergency meeting of the cabinet, approval was given for the formation of a task force to retake the islands. This was backed in an emergency session of the House of Commons the next day.[23]

On 6 April, the British Government set up a War Cabinet to provide day-to-day political oversight of the campaign.[3] This was the critical instrument of crisis management for the British with its remit being to "keep under review political and military developments relating to the South Atlantic, and to report as necessary to the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee." Until it was dissolved on 12 August, the War Cabinet met at least daily. Although Margaret Thatcher is described as dominating the War Cabinet, Lawrence Freedman notes in the Official History of the Falklands Campaign that she did not ignore opposition or fail to consult others. However, once a decision was reached she "did not look back".[3]

Position of third party countries
On the evening of the 3 April, Britain's United Nations ambassador Sir Anthony Parsons put a draft resolution to the United Nations Security Council. The resolution, which condemned the hostilities and demanded immediate Argentine withdrawal from the Islands, was adopted by the council the following day as United Nations Security Council Resolution 502, which passed with ten votes in support, one against and four abstentions (China, the Soviet Union, Poland and Spain).[23][24][25] The UK received further political support from the Commonwealth of Nations and the European Economic Community. The EEC also provided economic support by imposing economic sanctions on Argentina. Argentina itself was politically backed by a majority of countries in Latin America and the Non-Aligned Movement.[citation needed]

The war was an unexpected event in a world strained by the Cold War and the North–South divide. The response of some countries was the effort to mediate the crisis and later as the war began, the support (or criticism) based in terms of anti-colonialism, political solidarity, historical relationships or realpolitik. In other cases it was only verbal support.

The United States was concerned by the prospect of Argentina turning to the Soviet Union for support,[26] and initially tried to mediate an end to the conflict. However, when Argentina refused the U.S. peace overtures, U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced that the United States would prohibit arms sales to Argentina and provide material support for British operations. Both Houses of the U.S. Congress passed resolutions supporting the U.S. action siding with the United Kingdom.[27]

An important factor was military support. The U.S. provided the United Kingdom with military equipment ranging from submarine detectors to the latest missiles.[28][29][30] President Ronald Reagan approved the Royal Navy's request to borrow the Sea Harrier-capable amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) if the British lost an aircraft carrier. The United States Navy developed a plan to help the British man the ship with American military contractors, likely retired sailors with knowledge of the Iwo Jima's systems.[31] France provided dissimilar aircraft training so Harrier pilots could train against the French aircraft used by Argentina.[32] French and British intelligence also worked to prevent Argentina from obtaining more Exocet missiles on the international market,[33] while at the same time Peru attempted to purchase 12 missiles for Argentina, in a failed secret operation.[34][35] Chile gave support to Britain in the form of Intelligence about Argentine military and radar early warning.[36][37]

While France overtly backed the United Kingdom, a French technical team remained in Argentina throughout the war. French government sources have said the French team was engaged in intelligence-gathering; however, it simultaneously provided direct material support to the Argentines, identifying and fixing faults in Exocet missile launchers.[38] According to the book Operation Israel, advisors from Israel Aerospace Industries were already in Argentina and continued their work during the conflict. The book also claims that Israel sold weapons and drop tanks in a secret operation in Peru.[39][40] Peru also openly sent "Mirages, pilots and missiles" to Argentina during the war.[41] Through Libya, under Muammar Gaddafi, Argentina received 20 launchers and 60 SA-7 missiles, as well as machine guns, mortars and mines, all in all, the load of four trips of two Boeing 707 of the AAF, refuelled in Recife with the knowledge and consent of the Brazilian government.[42] Some of these clandestine logistics operations were mounted by the Soviet Union.[43]

British Task Force

The government had no contingency plan for an invasion of the islands, and the task force was rapidly put together from whatever vessels were available.[44] The nuclear submarine Conqueror set sail from France on 4 April, whilst the two aircraft carriers Invincible and Hermes, in the company of escort vessels, left Portsmouth only a day later.[23] Upon its return to Southampton from a world cruise on 7 April, the ocean liner SS Canberra was requisitioned and set sail two days later with 3 Commando Brigade aboard.[23] The ocean liner RMS Queen Elizabeth 2 was also requisitioned and left Southampton on 12 May with 5th Infantry Brigade on board.[23] The whole task force eventually comprised 127 ships: 43 Royal Navy vessels, 22 Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships and 62 merchant ships.[44]

The retaking of the Falkland Islands was considered extremely difficult: the main constraint being the disparity in deployable air cover. The British had a total of 42 aircraft, (28 Sea Harriers and 14 Harrier GR.3s) available for air combat operations,[45] against approximately 122 serviceable jet fighters, of which about 50 were employed as air superiority fighters and the remainder as strike aircraft, in Argentina's air forces during the war.[46] The U.S. Navy considered a successful counter-invasion by the British to be 'a military impossibility'.[47]

By mid-April, the Royal Air Force had set up the airbase of RAF Ascension Island co-located with Wideawake Airfield (USA) on the mid-Atlantic British overseas territory of Ascension Island, including a sizeable force of Avro Vulcan B Mk 2 bombers, Handley Page Victor K Mk 2 refuelling aircraft, and McDonnell Douglas Phantom FGR Mk 2 fighters to protect them. Meanwhile the main British naval task force arrived at Ascension to prepare for active service. A small force had already been sent south to recapture South Georgia.

Encounters began in April; the British Task Force was shadowed by Boeing 707 aircraft of the Argentine Air Force during their travel to the south.[48] Several of these flights were intercepted by Sea Harriers outside the British-imposed exclusion zone; the unarmed 707s were not attacked because diplomatic moves were still in progress and the UK had not yet decided to commit itself to armed force. On 23 April a Brazilian commercial Douglas DC-10 from VARIG Airlines en route to South Africa was intercepted by British Harriers who visually identified the civilian plane.[49]

Recapture of South Georgia and the attack on the Santa Fe
The South Georgia force, Operation Paraquet, under the command of Major Guy Sheridan RM, consisted of Marines from 42 Commando, a troop of the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) troops who were intended to land as reconnaissance forces for an invasion by the Royal Marines. All were embarked on RFA Tidespring. First to arrive was the Churchill-class submarine HMS Conqueror on 19 April, and the island was over-flown by a radar-mapping Handley Page Victor on 20 April.

The first landings of SAS troops took place on 21 April, but—with the southern hemisphere autumn setting in—the weather was so bad that their landings and others made the next day were all withdrawn after two helicopters crashed in fog on Fortuna Glacier. On 23 April, a submarine alert was sounded and operations were halted, with the Tidespring being withdrawn to deeper water to avoid interception. On 24 April, the British forces regrouped and headed in to attack.

On 25 April, after resupplying the Argentine garrison in South Georgia, the submarine ARA Santa Fe was spotted on the surface[50] by a Westland Wessex HAS Mk 3 helicopter from HMS Antrim, which attacked the Argentine submarine with depth charges. HMS Plymouth launched a Westland Wasp HAS.Mk.1 helicopter, and HMS Brilliant launched a Westland Lynx HAS Mk 2. The Lynx launched a torpedo, and strafed the submarine with its pintle-mounted general purpose machine gun; the Wessex also fired on the Santa Fe with its GPMG. The Wasp from HMS Plymouth as well as two other Wasps launched from HMS Endurance fired AS-12 ASM antiship missiles at the submarine, scoring hits. Santa Fe was damaged badly enough to prevent her from diving. The crew abandoned the submarine at the jetty at King Edward Point on South Georgia.

With the Tidespring now far out to sea and the Argentine forces augmented by the submarine's crew, Major Sheridan decided to gather the 76 men he had and make a direct assault that day. After a short forced march by the British troops and a naval bombardment demonstration by two Royal Navy vessels (Antrim and Plymouth), the Argentine forces surrendered without resistance. The message sent from the naval force at South Georgia to London was, "Be pleased to inform Her Majesty that the White Ensign flies alongside the Union Jack in South Georgia. God Save the Queen." The Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, broke the news to the media, telling them to "Just rejoice at that news!"[51]

Black Buck raids
On 1 May British operations on the Falklands opened with the "Black Buck 1" attack (of a series of five) on the airfield at Stanley. A Vulcan bomber from Ascension flew on an 8,000-nautical-mile (15,000 km; 9,200 mi) round trip dropping conventional bombs across the runway at Stanley and back to Ascension. The mission required repeated refuelling, and required several Victor tanker aircraft operating in concert, including tanker to tanker refuelling. The overall effect of the raids on the war is difficult to determine, and the raids consumed precious tanker resources from Ascension, but also prevented Argentina from stationing fast jets on the island.[52]

The raids did minimal damage to the runway and damage to radars was quickly repaired. Commonly dismissed as post-war propaganda,[53] Argentine sources originally claimed that the Vulcan raids influenced Argentina to withdraw some of its Mirage IIIs from Southern Argentina to the Buenos Aires Defence Zone.[54][55][56] The effect of this action was, however, watered down when British officials made clear that there would be no strikes on air bases in Argentina.[57]

Of the five Black Buck raids, three were against Stanley Airfield, with the other two anti-radar missions using Shrike anti-radiation missiles.

Escalation of the air war
The Falklands had only three airfields. The longest and only paved runway was at the capital, Stanley, and even that was too short to support fast jets (although an arrestor gear was fitted in April to support Skyhawks). Therefore, the Argentines were forced to launch their major strikes from the mainland, severely hampering their efforts at forward staging, combat air patrols and close air support over the islands. The effective loiter time of incoming Argentine aircraft was low, and they were later compelled to overfly British forces in any attempt to attack the islands.

The first major Argentine strike force comprised 36 aircraft (A-4 Skyhawks, IAI Daggers, English Electric Canberras, and Mirage III escorts), and was sent on 1 May, in the belief that the British invasion was imminent or landings had already taken place. Only a section of Grupo 6 (flying IAI Dagger aircraft) found ships, which were firing at Argentine defences near the islands. The Daggers managed to attack the ships and return safely. This greatly boosted morale of the Argentine pilots, who now knew they could survive an attack against modern warships, protected by radar ground clutter from the Islands and by using a late pop-up profile.

Meanwhile, other Argentine aircraft were intercepted by BAE Sea Harriers operating from HMS Invincible. A Dagger (piloted by Osvaldo Ardiles' cousin José[58]) and a Canberra were shot down.

Combat broke out between Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1 fighters of No. 801 Naval Air Squadron and Mirage III fighters of Grupo 8. Both sides refused to fight at the other's best altitude, until two Mirages finally descended to engage. One was shot down by an AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missile (AAM), while the other escaped but was damaged and without enough fuel to return to its mainland air base. The plane made for Stanley, where it fell victim to friendly fire from the Argentine defenders.[59]

As a result of this experience, Argentine Air Force staff decided to employ A-4 Skyhawks and Daggers only as strike units, the Canberras only during the night, and Mirage IIIs (without air refuelling capability or any capable AAM) as decoys to lure away the British Sea Harriers. The decoying would be later extended with the formation of the Escuadrón Fénix, a squadron of civilian jets flying 24 hours-a-day simulating strike aircraft preparing to attack the fleet. On one of these flights, an Air Force Learjet was shot down, killing the squadron commander, Vice Commodore Rodolfo De La Colina, the highest-ranking Argentine officer to die in the war.[60][61]

Stanley was used as an Argentine strongpoint throughout the conflict. Despite the Black Buck and Harrier raids on Stanley airfield (no fast jets were stationed there for air defence) and overnight shelling by detached ships, it was never out of action entirely. Stanley was defended by a mixture of surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems (Franco-German Roland and British Tigercat) and Swiss-built Oerlikon 35 mm twin anti-aircraft cannons. Lockheed Hercules transport night flights brought supplies, weapons, vehicles, and fuel, and airlifted out the wounded up until the end of the conflict.

The few Royal Navy Sea Harriers were considered too valuable by day to risk in night-time blockade operations. However, they did conduct nightly combat air patrols. Although the Sea Harrier Blue Fox radar was not very effective when looking down for targets over land, it was very effective over sea for both air and surface targets. It was admitted after the war, that many Argentine missions were aborted because their aircraft detected the Blue Fox radar in search mode.[62]

The only Argentine Hercules shot down by the British was lost on 1 June when TC-63 was intercepted by a Sea Harrier in daylight[63][64] when it was searching for the British fleet north-east of the islands after the Argentine Navy retired its last SP-2H Neptune due to airframe attrition.

Various options to attack the home base of the five Argentine Etendards at Río Grande were examined and discounted (Operation Mikado), subsequently five Royal Navy submarines lined up, submerged, on the edge of Argentina's 12-nautical-mile (22 km; 14 mi) territorial limit to provide early warning of bombing raids on the British task force.[65]

Sinking of ARA General Belgrano
Two separate British naval task forces (one of surface vessels and one of submarines) and the Argentine fleet were operating in the neighbourhood of the Falklands, and soon came into conflict. The first naval loss was the World War II-vintage Argentine light cruiser ARA General Belgrano. The nuclear-powered submarine HMS Conqueror sank the Belgrano on 2 May. Three hundred and twenty-three members of Belgrano's crew died in the incident. Over 700 men were rescued from the open ocean despite cold seas and stormy weather. The losses from Belgrano totalled nearly half of the Argentine deaths in the Falklands conflict and the loss of the ARA General Belgrano hardened the stance of the Argentine government.

Regardless of controversies over the sinking, it had a crucial strategic effect: the elimination of the Argentine naval threat. After her loss, the entire Argentine fleet, with the exception of the conventional submarine ARA San Luis,[50] returned to port and did not leave again for the duration of hostilities. The two escorting destroyers and the battle group centred on the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo both withdrew from the area, ending the direct threat to the British fleet that their pincer movement had represented.

In a separate incident later that night, British forces engaged an Argentine patrol gunboat, the ARA Alferez Sobral. At the time, the Alferez Sobral was searching for the crew of the Argentine Air Force Canberra light bomber shot down on 1 May. Two Royal Navy Lynx helicopters fired four Sea Skua missiles at her. Badly damaged and with eight crew dead, the Sobral managed to return to Puerto Deseado two days later. The Canberra's crew were never found.

Sinking of HMS Sheffield
On 4 May, two days after the sinking of Belgrano, the British lost the Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield to fire following an Exocet missile strike from the Argentine 2nd Naval Air Fighter/Attack Squadron. Sheffield had been ordered forward with two other Type 42s to provide a long-range radar and medium-high altitude missile picket far from the British carriers. She was struck amidships, with devastating effect, ultimately killing 20 crew members and severely injuring 24 others. The ship was abandoned several hours later, gutted and deformed by the fires that continued to burn for six more days. She finally sank outside the Maritime Exclusion Zone on 10 May.

The incident is described in detail by Admiral Sandy Woodward in his book One Hundred Days, Chapter One. Woodward was a former commanding officer of Sheffield.[66]

The tempo of operations increased throughout the second half of May as United Nations attempts to mediate a peace were rejected by the British, who felt that any delay would make a campaign impractical in the South Atlantic storms. The destruction of Sheffield had a profound impact on the British public, bringing home the fact that the "Falklands Crisis", as the BBC News put it, was now an actual "shooting war".

SAS operations
Given the threat to the British fleet posed by the Etendard-Exocet combination, plans were made to use SAS troops to attack the home base of the five Etendards at Río Grande, Tierra del Fuego. The operation was code named "Mikado".The operation was later scrapped, after acknowledging its chances of success were limited, and replaced the use of C-130s with a plan to lead HMS Onyx to drop SAS operatives several miles offshore at night for them to make their way to the coast aboard rubber inflatables and proceed to destroy Argentina's remaining Exocet stockpile.[67]

An SAS reconnaissance team was dispatched to carry out preparations for a seaborne infiltration. A Westland Sea King helicopter carrying the assigned team took off from HMS Invincible on the night of 17 May, but bad weather forced it to land 50 miles (80 km) from its target and the mission was aborted.[68] The pilot flew to Chile and dropped off the SAS team, before setting fire to his helicopter and surrendering to the Chilean authorities. The discovery of the burnt-out helicopter attracted considerable international attention at the time.

On 14 May the SAS carried out the raid on Pebble Island at the Falklands, where the Argentine Navy had taken over a grass airstrip map for FMA IA 58 Pucará light ground attack aircraft and T-34 Mentors. The raid destroyed the aircraft there.[notes 1]

Land battles on the Falkland Islands

Landing at San Carlos—Bomb Alley
During the night on 21 May the British Amphibious Task Group under the command of Commodore Michael Clapp (Commodore, Amphibious Warfare – COMAW) mounted Operation Sutton, the amphibious landing on beaches around San Carlos Water,[notes 2] on the northwestern coast of East Falkland facing onto Falkland Sound. The bay, known as Bomb Alley by British forces, was the scene of repeated air attacks by low-flying Argentine jets.[69][70]

The 4,000 men of 3 Commando Brigade were put ashore as follows: 2nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment (2 Para) from the RORO ferry Norland and 40 Commando Royal Marines from the amphibious ship HMS Fearless were landed at San Carlos (Blue Beach), 3rd Battalion, Parachute Regiment (3 Para) from the amphibious ship HMS Intrepid were landed at Port San Carlos (Green Beach) and 45 Commando from RFA Stromness were landed at Ajax Bay (Red Beach). Notably the waves of 8 LCUs and 8 LCVPs were led by Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour, who had commanded the Falklands detachment only a year previously. 42 Commando on the ocean liner SS Canberra was a tactical reserve. Units from the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers etc. and armoured reconnaissance vehicles were also put ashore with the landing craft, the Round table class LSL and mexeflote barges. Rapier missile launchers were carried as underslung loads of Sea Kings for rapid deployment.

By dawn the next day they had established a secure beachhead from which to conduct offensive operations. From there Brigadier Julian Thompson's plan was to capture Darwin and Goose Green before turning towards Port Stanley. Now, with the British troops on the ground, the Argentine Air Force began the night bombing campaign against them using Canberra bomber planes until the last day of the war (14 June).

At sea, the paucity of the British ships' anti-aircraft defences was demonstrated in the sinking of HMS Ardent on 21 May, HMS Antelope on 24 May, and MV Atlantic Conveyor (struck by two AM39 Exocets) on 25 May along with a vital cargo of helicopters, runway-building equipment and tents. The loss of all but one of the Chinook helicopters being carried by the Atlantic Conveyor was a severe blow from a logistics perspective.

Also lost on this day was HMS Coventry, a sister to Sheffield, whilst in company with HMS Broadsword after being ordered to act as decoy to draw away Argentine aircraft from other ships at San Carlos Bay.[71] HMS Argonaut and HMS Brilliant were badly damaged. However, many British ships escaped terminal damage because of the Argentine pilots' bombing tactics.

To avoid the highest concentration of British air defences, Argentine pilots released ordnance from very low altitude, and hence their bomb fuzes did not have sufficient time to arm before impact. The low release of the retarded bombs (some of which had been sold to the Argentines by the British years earlier) meant that many never exploded, as there was insufficient time in the air for them to arm themselves. A simple free-fall bomb will, during a low altitude release, impact almost directly below the aircraft which is then within the lethal fragmentation zone of the resulting explosion.

A retarded bomb has a small parachute or air brake that opens to reduce the speed of the bomb to produce a safe horizontal separation between the two. The fuze for a retarded bomb requires a minimum time over which the retarder is open to ensure safe separation. The pilots would have been aware of this, but due to the high concentration levels required to avoid SAMs and Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA), as well as any British Sea Harriers, many failed to climb to the necessary release point. The problem was solved by the improvised fitting of retarding devices, allowing low-level bombing attacks as employed on 8 June.

In his autobiographical account of the Falklands War, Admiral Woodward blames the BBC World Service for these changes to the bombs. The World Service reported the lack of detonations after receiving a briefing on the matter from a Ministry of Defence official. He describes the BBC as being more concerned with being "fearless seekers after truth" than with the lives of British servicemen.[72] Colonel 'H'. Jones levelled similar accusations against the BBC after they disclosed the impending British attack on Goose Green by 2 Para.

Thirteen bombs hit British ships without detonating.[73] Lord Craig, the retired Marshal of the Royal Air Force, is said to have remarked: "Six better fuses and we would have lost"[74] although Ardent and Antelope were both lost despite the failure of bombs to explode. The fuzes were functioning correctly, and the bombs were simply released from too low an altitude.[72] [75] The Argentines lost 22 aircraft in the attacks.[notes 3]


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  • 22. a b c Lawrence Freedman (15 August 2007). The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume 1: The Origins of the Falklands War. Routledge. pp. 202–203. ISBN 978-0-415-41912-3. Retrieved 5 February 2012.
  • 23. a b c d e "A Chronology of events during the Falklands Conflict of 1982". Falkland Islands Information. Retrieved 24 December 2011.
  • 24. Gold, Peter (2005). Gibraltar, British or Spanish?. Routledge. pp. 39. ISBN 0-415-34795-5.
  • 25. Gold, Peter (2005). Gibraltar, British or Spanish?. Routledge. pp. 37. ISBN 0-415-34795-5.
  • 26. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/01/us-feared-falklands-war-documents
  • 27. Grimmett, Richard F. (1 June 1999). "Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress". U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 24 February 2010.
  • 28. Caspar Weinberger, In the Arena: A Memoir of the Twentieth Century, with Gretchen Roberts (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2001), 374.
  • 29. Paul Reynolds, "Obituary: Caspar Weinberger," BBC News, 28 March 2006.
  • 30. Graham Jenkins, "Reagan, Thatcher, and the Tilt," Automatic Ballpoint, 7 May 2010.
  • 31. "Reagan Readied U.S. Warship for '82 Falklands War". News and Analysis, U.S. Naval Institute. 27 June 2012. Retrieved 27 June 2012.
  • 32. John, Nott (2002). "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow". "As soon as the conflict began Hernou (French Defence Minister) got in touch with me to make available a Super-Etendard and Mirage aircraft so our Harrier pilots could train against them before setting off to the South Atlantic. (John Nott, defence minister during the Falklands war)"
  • 33. John, Nott (2002). "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow". "A remarkable world-wide operation then ensured to prevent further Exocets being bought by Argentina. I authorised our agents to pose as bona fide purchasers of equipment on the international market, ensuring that we outbid the Argentineans. Other agents identified Exocet missiles in various markets and covertly rendered them inoperable, based on information from the French. (John Nott, defence minister during the Falklands war)"
  • 34. "The Peruvian Exocet connection in the Falklands/Malvinas war". Mercopress. 3 April 2012. Retrieved 21 April 2012.
  • 35. "El otro rol de Peru durante la guerra de Malvinas" (in Spanish). Infobae. 1 April 2012. Retrieved 21 April 2012.
  • 36. Interview with Chilean Air Force Chief during the Falklands War Fernando Matthei Malvinas: "Hice todo lo posible para que Argentina perdiera la guerra" in Clarin, Buenos Aires on 1. September 2005. Retrieved 11 Jule 2011
  • 37. Freedman, Lawrence (2005). The Official History of the Falklands Campaign. New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-36431-7. p. 397
  • 38. Thomson, Mike (5 March 2012). "How France helped both sides in the Falklands War". BBC
  • 39. Robin Yapp (20 April 2011). "Israel 'supplied arms to Argentina during Falklands War'". Daily Telegraph. Retrieved 18 April 2012.
  • 40. "'Begin aided Argentina during Falklands War to avenge the British'". Haaretz. 21 April 2011. Retrieved 18 April 2012.
  • 41. "Tras el pedido de perdón y en medio de elogios, Cristina regresó de Perú" in Argentine newspaper Clarín on 24 March 2010 (Spanish)
  • 42. Hernan Dobry in article Kadafi fue un amigo solidario de la dictadura durante Malvinas, in Argentine newspaper Perfil on 27 February 2011, in Spanish language
  • 43. "Brazil helped Soviet support operation for Argentina during the Falklands conflict". MercoPress. 23 April 2012. Retrieved 6 June 2012.
  • 44. a b "The Falkland Islands Conflict, 1982". Global Security. Retrieved 25 December 2011.
  • 45. "AV-8B Harrier Operations". GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved 21 April 2010.
  • 46. Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War
  • 47. One Hundred Days Woodward, Admiral Sandy (1992) Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, p.72. ISBN 978-1-55750-651-1; ISBN 978-1-55750-652-8. Cited in To Rule The Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World Herman, A (2004) Harper Collins, New York, p. 560.
  • 48. FAA map at the Wayback Machine (archived October 24, 2007)
  • 49. Brown, 1987, p. 110.
  • 50. a b "Submarine Operations during the Falklands War – US Naval War College". Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  • 51. "1982: Marines land in South Georgia". BBC. 25 April 1982. Retrieved 20 June 2005.
  • 52. Ward 2003, p. 186 "... to get twenty-one bombs to Port Stanley is going to take about one million, one hundred thousand pounds of fuel – equalled [sic] about 137,000 gallons. That was enough fuel to fly 260 Sea Harrier bombing missions over Port Stanley. Which in turn meant just over 1300 bombs. Interesting stuff!"
  • 53. Ward 2003, pp. 247–48 "Propaganda was, of course, used later to try to justify these missions: 'The Mirage IIIs were redrawn from Southern Argentina to Buenos Aires to add to the defences there following the Vulcan raids on the islands.' Apparently the logic behind this statement was that if the Vulcan could hit Port Stanley, the[sic] Buenos Aires was well within range as well and was vulnerable to similar attacks. I never went along with that baloney. A lone Vulcan or two running in to attack Buenos Aires without fighter support would have been shot to hell in quick time."-"Mirage IIIs were in evidence near the islands on several occasions during the conflict, either escorting the Neptune reconnaissance missions or on 'interference' flights that attempted to draw CAP attention away from air-to-ground attacks."-"Suffice it to say that you didn't need more than one or two Mirage IIIs to intercept a Vulcan attack on Buenos Aires"-"It would have taken much more than a lone Vulcan raid to upset Buenos Aires"
  • 54. "Offensive Air Operations Of The Falklands War". Globalsecurity.org. ""As a result of these heavy losses...it was decided to pull the Mirage III's back to the mainland to stand alert for a possible Vulcan attack.""
  • 55. "The Falkland Islands Conflict, 1982: Air Defense Of The Fleet". Globalsecurity.org. ""Finally, the bombing raids caused the Argentines to fear an air attack on the mainland, causing them to retain some Mirage aircraft and Roland missiles for defense.""
  • 56. "La familia Mirage" (in Spanish). Aeroespacio (Fuerza Aerea Argentina). ISSN 0001-9127. ""Los M III debían defender el territorio continental argentino de posibles ataques de los bombarderos Vulcan de la RAF, brindar escolta a los cazabombarderos de la FAA, e impedir los ataques de aviones de la Royal Navy y de la RAF sobre las Malvinas."
  • 57. ("The M III would defend the Argentine mainland against possible attacks by Vulcan bombers from the RAF, providing escort of fighter bombers to the FAA, and to prevent attacks by aircraft of the Royal Navy and RAF on the Falklands.")"[dead link]
  • 58. "The Falkland Islands Conflict, 1982: Air Defense Of The Fleet". Globalsecurity.org. ""Unfortunately the British Secretary of State for Defence announced sometime later that Britain would not bomb targets on the Argentine mainland. This statement was undoubtedly welcomed by the Argentine military command because it permitted the very limited number of Roland SAM's to be deployed around the airfield at Stanley.""
  • 59. "Argentine Air Force remembers its "baptism of fire" twenty years on". En.mercopress.com. 1 May 2002. Retrieved 9 June 2010.
  • 60. Rodríguez Mottino, Horacio: La Artillería Argentina en Malvinas. Ed. Clío, 1985. P. 170.
  • 61. "Fuerza Aérea Argentina". Fuerzaaerea.mil.ar. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  • 62. "noticias". Madryn.gov.ar. 2 April 2009. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  • 63. Sea Harrier Over the Falklands, Cdr 'Sharkey' Ward, 2003[page needed]
  • 64. "Fuerza Aérea Argentina". Fuerzaaerea.mil.ar. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  • 65. "ASN Aircraft accident description Lockheed C-130H Hercules TC-63 – Pebble Island". Aviation-safety.net. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  • 66. Evans, Michael (27 November 2007). "Underwater and undercover: how nuclear subs were first line of Falklands defence". The Times (London).
  • 67. Woodward, Sandy. One Hundred Days. p. 8. ISBN 978-0-00-713467-0.
  • 68. "The SAS vs the Exocet". eliteukforces.info. 27 October 2007. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  • 69. Evans, Michael; Hamilton, Alan (27 June 2005). "Thatcher in the dark on sinking of Belgrano". The Times
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  • 71. "Americas | Charles ends Falklands tour on sombre note". BBC News. 15 March 1999. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  • 72. Rumley, Leesa (1 June 2007). "Captain Hart Dyke, Commanding Officer of ''HMS Coventry''". BBC News. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  • 73. a b Woodward, Sandy (2003). One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander. HarperCollins. ISBN 0-00-713467-3; ISBN 978-1-55750-651-1; ISBN 978-1-55750-652-8..[page needed]
  • 74. "British Ships Sunk and Damaged – Falklands War 1982". Naval-history.net. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  • 75. Gethin Chamberlain (5 April 2002). "Would British forces be able to retake the Falklands today?" (subscription required to access archive service). The Scotsman (UK): p. 12. Archived from the original on 5 April 2002.

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